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The EU’s Sanctions against Syria:  
Conflict Management by Other Means 
Clara Portela 
Since May 2011, the EU has launched one 
of its most far reaching and sophisticated 
sanctions  operations  in  support  of  the 
protests against the current regime in Syria. 
The  present  brief  examines  the  measures 
wielded by the EU, its expected impact and 
its implications for the EU’s relations with 
its  global  partners.  While  seriously 
undermined  by  the  lack  of  support  of 
Russia,  the  sanctions  are  having  a 
noticeable  economic  impact.  Yet,  the 
choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the 
bloodshed. The sanctions have also served 
to  (re)define  partnerships  with  other 
powers,  both  in  the  Middle-East  and 
globally. 
One year and a half after the beginning of the 
anti-regime  protests,  the  European  Union’s 
(EU)  response  to  the  Arab  Spring  has  taken 
some  unprecedented  traits.  The  popular 
uprisings in the Arab world have led the EU to 
employ an instrument it had been traditionally 
reluctant to use in this region: sanctions. They 
were imposed against targets in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya in the early days of the Arab Spring. 
However,  they  fulfilled  different  roles:  In 
Tunisia  and  Egypt,  where  leaderships  were 
unseated  after  only  few  weeks  of  protests, 
giving way to transitional governments, the EU 
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froze the assets held in European accounts in 
order to prevent ousted leaders from accessing 
state funds. In Libya, sanctions were quickly 
followed by a multinational military operation 
under  NATO  command  which  precipitated 
the defeat of government forces. By contrast, 
in Syria neither have the protests succeeded in 
ousting President Bashar Al-Assad, nor has the 
use of force been seriously contemplated. The 
Syrian  leadership  consistently  refuses  to  step 
down or to negotiate with opposition groups, 
opting  instead  for  a  strategy  of  repression 
which  has  been  the  subject  of  widespread 
international  condemnation.  Since  the 
eruption  of  violence  in  March  2011,  the 
situation has been characterised by stalemate, 
until protesters started making progress against 
government forces in July 2012. In the face of 
continued  violence,  the  United  Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) remains deadlocked: 
Russia  has  indicated  its  readiness  to  yield  a 
veto  against  any  proposal  to  intervene.  A 
military  operation  to  put  an  end  to  the 
crackdown on protesters remains unlikely for 
fear of a domino effect that could exacerbate 
conflicts in this volatile region. The UK along 
with the US and some of Syria’s neighbours 
(Saudi  Arabia  and  Qatar),  has  resorted  to 
arming opposition forces. Yet, the EU is still 
far  away  from  reaching  an  agreement  on 
military  intervention  –  even  though  calls  in 
that  direction  proliferate  among  European 
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politicians. In the absence of policy alternatives, 
sanctions  currently  constitute  the  core  of  the 
EU’s response to the conflict in Syria. The EU 
first  asked  Al-Assad  to  negotiate  with  the 
opposition,  then  to  cease  repression,  and  as 
from  August  2011,  to  leave  office  (Balfour 
2012).  These  demands  were  supported  by 
sanctions imposed alongside those of the US, 
and  tightened  in  reaction  to  successive 
crackdowns on civilians. 
 
The  sanctions  against  Syria  are 
unprecedented.  To  begin  with,  the  EU 
deployed the virtual entirety of measures in the 
sanctions toolbox within less than a year. In its 
past  practice,  it  usually  wielded  an  arms 
embargo and a visa ban on the leadership and 
their associates. The tightening of sanctions in 
subsequent  rounds  often  consisted  in 
lengthening the blacklist and applying an assets 
freeze  to  the  featured  individuals.  While  this 
process often took years, the sanctions against 
Syria have accumulated the whole set in just a 
few  months.  Most  notably,  they  entail  an 
energy embargo, namely a ban on the import of 
oil from Syria – a rare measure for the EU to 
adopt in the absence of a UNSC mandate given 
that the EU imports this oil to meet its own 
energy needs. Prior to the embargo, the EU’s 
import  of  Syrian  crude  was  worth  over  €3 
billion  a  year,  and  went  mostly  to  Italy  and 
Germany
1. Finally, sanctions were agreed at the 
request of the League of Arab States (LAS), a 
regional organisation that had encouraged such 
measures against one of its members only once 
before in its history – against Iraq in the early 
1990s.  
 
A WHOLE SET IN LESS THAN A YEAR 
The declared objective of the EU is to increase 
pressure  on  the  Assad  regime  to  end 
repression,  withdraw  the  Syrian  army  from 
besieged towns and cities, the implementation 
of democratic reforms and an inclusive national 
dialogue.  The  sanctions  wielded  against  Syria 
encompass  17  sets  of  restrictive  measures, 
according to the EU’s own counting (Council 
2012). The sanctions package comprises a set 
of  very  diverse  measures  which  can  be 
expected  to  affect  the  regime  and  Syrian 
society  very  differently.  Also,  these  measures 
display  different  level  of  “targetedness”, 
defined  in  terms  of  their  capacity  to 
discriminate between targets. A brief overview
2  
of the main prohibitions follows:  
• A first set of sanctions targets the Syrian 
government:  EU  sanctions  prohibit 
disbursements  and  assistance  by  the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) as well 
as  new  grants  or  loans  by  the  member 
states.  The  EIB  had  some  17  project 
underway in Syria in 2011, and reportedly 
a  portfolio  worth  €1.3  billion  (Norman 
2011).  In  the  same  vein,  measures  are 
designed to ensure that private actors in 
Europe  do  not  issue  loans  for  those 
cooperation  projects  that  have  been 
interrupted  by  the  EU  –  notably,  the 
construction of power plants. The issuing 
of  insurance  to  the  Syrian  government 
and  the  opening  of  new  subsidiaries  of 
Syrian banks in the EU are banned, as is 
the opening of new offices of European 
banks  in  Syria.  The  assets  of  the  Syrian 
central bank in the EU are frozen and it is 
forbidden  to  trade  public  bonds  to  and 
from  the  Syrian  government,  public 
bodies and financial institutions. 
 
• A  second  set  of  sanctions  targets  those 
individuals  directly  involved  in  the 
exercise of repression, with the intention 
of  affecting  them  and  their  associates 
personally.  They  are  prohibited  from 
entering the territory of the EU, and the 
assets  they  hold  in  Europe  are  frozen. 
These  individuals  feature  in  a  blacklist 
currently  comprising  155  entries,  while 
the blacklist of entities to which they are 
linked numbers 53. The freezing of assets 
and  the  visa  ban  on  the  leadership  and 
their associates fulfils a double objective: 
cutting them off from financial assets so 
these cannot be used for repression and   3 
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making  the  conduct  of  their  business  in 
Europe more difficult. Family members of 
the  Syrian  leadership  are  simultaneously 
heading  state  companies  and  entities 
associated  with  the  regime  –  a  personal 
connection  that  warrants  their  listing.  In 
addition,  they  stigmatise  blacklisted 
individuals  and  inconvenience  them  in  a 
private capacity. 
 
• A third set of sanctions is directed towards 
the  repressive  apparatus  of  the  regime. 
Some measures concern the arms sector: 
the  transfer  of  weapons  and  equipment 
that can be used for internal repression is 
banned.  The  arms  embargo  is 
supplemented  by  technical  and  financial 
assistance related to these items. The initial 
arms  ban  was  broadened  to  encompass 
some dual-use items in the tightening that 
took  place  in  April  2012.  An  innovative 
measure  not  covered  by  standard  EU 
embargoes consists in banning the supply 
of software for the interception of internet 
and  phone  communications;  in  other 
words, the sort of equipment necessary for 
the  security  forces  to  locate  opposition 
forces  and  monitor  their  activities.  The 
latest  reinforcement  of  the  embargo 
consists in the decision to inspect vessels 
and  aircraft  suspected  of  transporting 
weapons  to  Syria  via  Europe,  a  measure 
along the lines of UNSC sanctions regimes 
against  Iran  and  North  Korea.  
The  EU  arms  embargo  is  not  bound  to 
have any major effect: Syria’s top weapons 
suppliers  are  Russia,  Iran,  Belarus  and 
North  Korea,  while  supplies  from 
European countries stopped already in the 
early  nineties.  Russian  arms  exports  to 
Syria have more than tripled in the period 
from  2008  to  2011
3,  and  continue  into 
2012.  Nevertheless,  the  mere  prohibition 
of software can have some limited impact, 
as  alternative  suppliers  can  offer  similar 
technology, but of lower efficacy.  
 
• A  fourth  set  of  sanctions  specifically 
targets  the  energy  sector,  with  the 
intention of cutting off the government’s 
sources  of  revenue,  and  thus  weaken 
repression.  These  entail  a  ban  on  the 
import  of  oil  and  petroleum  products 
from  Syria,  but  also  a  prohibition  on 
providing  insurance  to  this  sector, 
supplying  technology  for  the  oil  and 
natural  gas  sector,  as  well  as  providing 
loans  to  enterprises  engaged  in  the  oil 
industry.  The  purchase  or  increase  in 
participation in Syrian enterprises engaged 
in  the  oil  sector  is  prohibited.  The 
electricity  sector  is  also  affected: 
participation  in  the  construction  of  new 
power plants for electricity generation, the 
provision  of  technical  or  financial 
assistance  and  the  creation  of  joint 
ventures to that end is also banned.  The 
ban on oil and petroleum products from 
Syria is the single most powerful measure 
in the package, given that fuels and mining 
products constitute over 89% of the EU’s 
imports from Syria.
4 The ban on insurance 
has  serious  economic  implications,  since 
oil shipments now have to be insured by 
authorities  in  the  recipient  states,  which 
might not be prepared to bear the costs. 
 
• A  fifth  category  concerns  trade 
restrictions.  Measures  affecting  bilateral 
trade include a ban on cargo-only flights, 
and a ban on the export of certain goods: 
luxury  products,  gold,  diamonds  and 
precious  metals.  Aside  from  the  oil 
embargo, the trade measures are modest. 
The  EU  merely  imported  some  textiles 
and  agricultural  products  from  Syria, 
sectors representing respectively 4.8% and 
2.7%  of  total  imports  from  Syria.  The 
restrictions  affecting  trade  are  geared 
towards preventing conspicuous upgrades 
in the limited trade flows that remain after 
the  import  of  oil,  which  made  up  most 
bilateral trade. The ban on luxury goods, 
one of the most recent measures, is also   4 
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directed against the elite. Overall, the bans 
affect imports are rather marginal. In 2011, 
Syria  was  the  EU’s  54th  trading  partner, 
accounting for only 0.2% of its trade with 
the world. By contrast, the EU accounted 
for  21%  of  Syrian  trade  with  the  world
5, 
and  the  export  of  crude  oil  to  the  EU 
represented 27.4% of total exports in 2010. 
Restrictions also concern the provision of 
financial support for trade: member states 
are  not  allowed  to  enter  into  long-term 
commitments,  while  short-  and  medium-
term  financial  support  for  nationals  and 
entities trading with Syria are discouraged. 
In  spite  of  these  restrictions,  trade 
preferences  per  se  have  not  been 
withdrawn – the procedure foreseen for the 
suspension  of  the  Generalised  System  of 
Preferences (GSP) would take over a year, 
and the fear is that it would mostly affect 
small and medium enterprises unconnected 
to the regime. 
 
Finally,  several  EU  member  states  such  as 
Belgium,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and 
Spain have closed their embassies in Damascus, 
a diplomatic sanction that does not qualify as an 
EU measure given that it was not jointly agreed 
by  the  European  Council.  Yet,  the  EU 
Delegation remains open.  
 
BUT CAN THEY WORK?  
What impact do these measures have – and do 
they  stand  a  chance  of  succeeding  in 
discouraging  repression?  EU  officials  have 
reportedly indicated that the sanctions package 
“seems  to  make  the  functioning  of  the 
government  more  difficult”  and  “causes 
significant  anxiety  and  concern  to  the  Syrian 
regime” (Mahony 2012). In order to transform 
the arms embargo into an effective measure, it 
would  need  to  be  universalised  and  made 
mandatory by means of a UNSC Resolution – a 
step  that  the  EU  and  the  US  have  been 
promoting  to  no  avail,  most  recently  in  July 
2012. Certain measures can hardly be expected 
to instil a policy change in spite of the strong 
symbolism of the message they convey, such 
as the ban on luxury goods or the blacklisting 
of  high-ranking  officials.  The  trump  card  of 
the sanctions package is the oil embargo, given 
that most of the oil produced by Syria used to 
be sold to the EU. This constitutes the only 
measure,  along  with  the  restrictions  in  the 
banking sector, which is reportedly fulfilling its 
objective  of  depriving  the  regime  of  key 
revenue (Landis 2012). According to the EIB, 
in  2011  growth  was  negative  (estimated  at  -
2%) due to the conflict and the international 
sanctions, and with the decrease in oil, tourism 
and tax revenues, the fiscal deficit is expected 
to  increase  to  11%.
6  The  GDP  reportedly 
contracted by 3.4% during 2011, according to 
the Economist Intelligence Unit. However, the 
prohibition on insurance and supply of spare 
parts for the oil and gas sector, which proved 
effective when applied on Libya by the US in 
the  1990s,  needs  years  to  display  its  results. 
One  could  presume  that  the  trade-related 
measures  are  susceptible  of  affecting  trade 
beyond  the  stipulated  prohibitions  by 
increasing  the  risk  premium  on  economic 
engagement  with  Syria.  In  other  words, 
European  companies  might  be  discouraged 
from  conducting  trade  with  Syria  even  in 
goods that are currently permitted for fear that 
what  is  now  legitimate  commerce  might  be 
banned in a subsequent tightening. However, 
such  effects  are  hardly  desirable:  Firstly, 
because EU sanctions aspire to be targeted and 
should  discriminate  between  those  who  are 
involved in government repression and those 
who are not; and secondly because they may 
interfere with the provisions for the numerous 
humanitarian  exemptions  that  permeate  EU 
sanctions legislation.  
 
STRATEGIC  ISSUE,  DECEPTIVE 
PARTNERSHIPS  
If hitherto unable to halt the violence in Syria, 
the EU has nonetheless managed to take joint 
action  and  to  position  itself  on  this  delicate 
issue  vis-à-vis  other  regional  and  global 
powers.  Significantly,  the  EU’s  sanctions   5 
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package is in tune with the position of Syria’s 
neighbours:  the  imposition  of  sanctions 
responded  to  a  call  by  the  Arab  League, 
composed by a group of countries traditionally 
sceptical  of  the  use  of  this  policy  tool.  The 
suspension  of  Syrian  membership  by  the 
Organisation  of  Islamic  Co-operation,  a  body 
composed of 57 members, highlights the wide 
condemnation  of  the  regime  among  Islamic 
countries (with the notable exception of Syria’s 
ally: Iran). The position of the EU has a double, 
partly  contradictory  motivation.  Part  of  the 
impulse behind the sanctions is to show support 
for the Arab uprisings, in an attempt to make up 
for  its  lack  of  determination  during  the  first 
weeks of the Arab spring in early 2011. The self-
avowed half-heartedness with which the EU had 
promoted  democracy  in  the  region  until  the 
popular  revolts  erupted  constitutes  an 
embarrassing background to the EU’s attempts 
to  profile  itself  as  a  supporter  of  the  protest 
movement. This puts EU sanctions policy more 
in  tune  with  its  programmatic  intention  to 
promote  democracy  and  human  rights  – a  
departure  from  its  earlier  practice  in  the  Arab 
World,  where  it  had  exclusively  wielded 
sanctions in support of anti-terrorism and non-
proliferation goals. On the other hand, the EU is 
simultaneously  aligning  itself  with  regional 
powers which resist the spread of democracy in 
the  Middle  East,  such  as  Qatar  and  especially 
Saudi Arabia.    
 
The  Syrian  sanctions  package  has  had  the 
effect of aligning the EU and the US closely in 
an encouraging example of effective transatlantic 
collaboration:  after  some  initial  disagreements 
about  the  scope  of  the  arms  embargo,  the 
measures  agreed  by  the  EU  almost  perfectly 
match  those  put  in  place  by  the  US.  This 
coincidence  prevents  a  situation  in  which 
European companies can take over trade links 
previously  entertained  by  US  companies  – 
something  that  is  now  being  done  by  non-
Western operators. Also, the sanctions operation 
against Syria contributes to the US objective of 
containing Iran, who is the target of a parallel 
sanctions regime. Sanctions have been adopted 
by  traditional  partners  of  the  EU,  such  as 
Switzerland.  Even  Turkey,  a  key  regional 
power  directly  neighbouring  on  Syria,  has 
imposed  sanctions  that  go  beyond  “any 
previous  Turkish  sanctions  against  any 
neighbour”  (Walker  2012).  Turkey  originally 
wielded an arms embargo, assets freezes, and 
diplomatic  sanctions,  but  later  added  trade 
sanctions such as raising taxes on Syrian goods 
and closing border crossings for trade.   
 
The sanctions have pitted the EU against 
Russia, one of its “strategic partners”, which 
continues  to  threaten  a  veto  in  the  UNSC. 
Supporting  the  sanctions  would  contradict 
significant traits of its foreign policy. It would 
entail  ceasing  support  for  the  last  remaining 
ally  inherited  from  the  Cold  War  era  in  a 
region where it is almost deprived of influence. 
The  strategic  importance  of  Syria  to  Russia 
does  not  only  emanate  from  the  lucrative 
weapons deals it secures, but also from being 
the host of Russia’s only maritime base in the 
Mediterranean.  Losing  Syria,  Russia’s  last 
stronghold  in  the  Middle  East,  would  be  a 
major psychological and reputational setback. 
Furthermore,  Moscow  has  a  principled 
reluctance  to  be  seen  as  supporting  “regime 
change”  against  a  long-standing  associate, 
especially as Russia’s allies elsewhere expect to 
be reassured of unwavering Russian support in 
the face of Western pressure.  
 
Other  powers  occupy  a  middle  position 
somewhere between the transatlantic and the 
Russian  stance.  The  stance  of  other  BRICS 
countries has become evident thanks to their 
membership  of  the  UNSC  in  the  period 
2011/12. Brazil, South Africa and India, who 
served  in  the  UNSC  as  the  Syrian  crisis 
unfolded,  abstained  from  a  draft  resolution 
condemning  Syrian  repression  in  October 
2011. Last year’s experience in Libya showed 
how  a  UNSC  mandate  authorising  force  in 
application  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
“Responsibility to Protect” could be used by   6 
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external powers to launch a fully-fledged war. 
This  has  tempered  the  BRICS’  appetite  to 
endorse  mandates  along  similar  lines.  By 
holding back from a UNSC resolution, BRICS 
are  siding  with  each  other  in  resisting  new 
action  cementing  the  admissibility  of 
intervention  to  address  internal  repression. 
Nevertheless,  an  evolution  is  visible.  Having 
grown  increasingly  condemnatory  of  Syrian 
repression, India and South Africa supported a 
resolution  last  February  similar  to  the  failed 
draft  of  October  2011,  which  was  eventually 
vetoed by Russia and China. In turn, the shift 
in  India’s  and  South  Africa’s  votes  has 
apparently compelled veto-bearing countries to 
somewhat distance themselves from Damascus 
(Traub  2012).  While  China  has  consistently 
vetoed  UN  resolutions  alongside  Russia,  its 
condemnation  of  the  Syrian  government  has 
become  harsher.  If  Moscow  was  to  relax  its 
opposition, Beijing would likely be reluctant to 
wield its veto, especially given that its interests 
are  not  directly  involved.  The  recent 
proliferation  crises  in  Iran  and  North  Korea 
have  seen  China  agreeing  to  sanctions, 
privileging regional stability and its image as a 
“responsible  power”  over  its  traditional 
adherence to the principle of non-intervention 
(Oertel 2011).  
 
The  BRICS  positioning  around  the  Syrian 
issue  suggests  that  the  EU’s  strategic 
partnerships  have  not  been  of  much  use  in 
winning  the  support  of  emerging  powers. 
Russia, a strategic partner, constitutes the main 
obstacle  hindering  sanctions,  while  Turkey, 
both a key regional power and a NATO ally 
which does not enjoy such status, has resolutely 
aligned  itself  with  the  EU  and  the  US. 
Disappointingly, the communiqué of the most 
recent EU-China High-Level strategic dialogue 
does  contain  one  single  reference  to  Syria 
(European Union 2012). In sum, the reaction 
of regional and global powers to crises like the 
one in Syria remains mostly driven by interests 
alien  to  the  policy    preferences  of  the  EU, 
whose  influence  through  its  strategic 
partnerships  remains  hardly  noticeable  – a n  
outcome  that  puts  into  question  the  very 
raison d’être of these partnerships.        
 
SYRIA  AND  THE  FUTURE  OF  EU 
SANCTIONS POLICY 
The  analysis  that  the  combined  EU  and  US 
sanctions against Syria are causing considerable 
damage  to  the  economy  is  unusually 
consensual  –  even  though,  at  the  time  of 
writing,  its  impact  on  the  power  balance  in 
Syria and on the course of the crisis is difficult 
to  ascertain.  The  irony  about  EU  energy 
sanctions  is  that  only  extremely  pressing 
situations  such  as  violent  government 
repression entailing growing civilian casualties 
garner sufficient support for the swift adoption 
of  strong  measures  like  energy  bans  or 
embargoes on oil extraction equipment. And 
yet, because these measures require some time 
to  produce  sufficient  damage  to  encourage 
concessions,  they  are  ill-suited  to  address 
situations requiring an urgent fix such as the 
current crisis in Syria.  
 
Which future does the current response to 
Syria  herald  for  EU  sanctions  policy?  The 
sanctions  package  against  Syria  demonstrates 
that  the  EU  is  able  to  surmount  the  main 
structural  deficiency  of  its  sanctions,  namely 
the weakness of its measures in terms of the 
little  disutility  they  cause  (Portela  2010). 
Notably,  the  package  includes  import  and 
export  bans  damaging  some  European 
business interests, a feature it shares with the 
Iran sanctions. The reluctance to affect trade 
constituted so far a “red line” that had hardly 
ever been crossed in the absence of a UNSC 
mandate, with the exception of the special case 
of the arms trade. Moreover, trade bans such 
as  the  prohibition  to  import  gems  from 
Myanmar were bound to have only negligible 
economic impact for European companies. By 
contrast, we are now witnessing how security 
interests  trump  commercial  advantage.  Also, 
the speed with which the whole package was 
agreed  was  remarkable  for  EU  standards:  in   7   
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the past, sanctions regimes were tightened very 
slowly,  with  upgrades  often  consisting  in  the 
mere lengthening of existing blacklists. For an 
entity believed to be too unwieldy to frame a 
credible sanctions policy only a few years ago, 
the  EU’s  crafting  of  sanctions  has  been 
remarkably speedy and broad – particularly in 
view of the block’s growing membership and 
the persisting unanimity rule under which the 
CFSP operates.  
 
Sadly,  the  fact  that  the  EU  incorporates 
selective  trade  bans  in  its  sanctions  has 
distressing  implications.  Firstly,  it  signifies  a 
move  away  from  the  narrowly  targeted 
sanctions  that  impeccably  characterised  EU 
sanctions policy. Because assets freeze and visa 
bans are based on a blacklist, they single out 
those  individuals  and  entities  held  to  bear 
responsibility  for  misbehaviour.  By  contrast, 
selective  embargoes  affect  entire  sectors  and 
are  those  more  likely  to  disadvantage 
individuals  bearing  no  responsibility  for  the 
condemned policies. Finally, while the blacklists 
did  not  pose  any  major  obstacle  to  bilateral 
trade  with  targets,  the  inclusion  of  trade 
restrictions  will  do  little  to  increase  the 
popularity  of  a  sanctions  regime  widely 
regarded  as  a  poor  substitute  for  an  unlikely 
military intervention.   
 
Endnotes 
1 F i g u r e s  f o r  2 0 1 0 ,  h t t p : / / e x p o r t h e l p . e u r o p a . e u ,  
[accessed 30 July 2012] 
2 F o r  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  l e g a l  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  c o n s u l t  
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_e
n.pdf, in particular Council Decisions 2011/782/CFSP, 
2012/122/CFSP and 2012/206/CFSP. 
3 F i g u r e s  f r o m  S I P R I  A r m s  T r a n s f e r s  D a t a b a s e ,  
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, [accessed 
30 July 2012] 
4 F i g u r e s  f o r  2 011,  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/syria/, 
[accessed 30 July 2012] 
5 Ibid. 
6 Figures from EIB, 
http://www.eib.europa.eu/attachments/country/syria_2
012_en.pdf, [accessed 30 July 2012] 
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